



Gandhian Philosophy, Conflict Resolution Theory and Practical Approaches to Negotiation

Author(s): Thomas Weber

Source: *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Jul., 2001), pp. 493-513

Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/424899>

Accessed: 10-06-2015 14:46 UTC

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.



Sage Publications, Ltd. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Journal of Peace Research*.

<http://www.jstor.org>

Gandhian Philosophy, Conflict Resolution Theory and Practical Approaches to Negotiation

THOMAS WEBER

School of Sociology, Politics and Anthropology, La Trobe University

It is puzzling that links between Gandhian social philosophy and recent conflict resolution/negotiation literature, especially given the latter's Gandhian 'flavour', have received so little scholarly attention. While there seems to be no direct causal link between the two bodies of knowledge, conflict resolution literature in the guise of modern problem-solving and win-win (as opposed to power-based and zero-sum) approaches leading to integrative conflict resolution (as opposed to mere compromise and distributive outcomes) strongly echoes Gandhi's own writings and the analyses of some Gandhi scholars. This is especially true in the case of non-mainstream writings that see conflict resolution techniques as potentially being about more than the solution of immediate problems, that see a broader personal and societal transformation as the ultimate goal. This article explores these connections and argues that Gandhian *satyagraha* should be squarely located within conflict resolution discourse.

Introduction

Many celebrated peace activists and Nobel Peace Prize recipients have acknowledged their intellectual debt to Mahatma Gandhi, and there has also been much written about Gandhi's influence on social activists (for example, Ingram, 1990) and some writing on his influence on the shaping of recent significant peace, justice and environmental philosophies (Weber, 1999). However, it is puzzling that possible links between Gandhian praxis and the recent conflict resolution/negotiation literature have received so little attention. Gandhi was, after all, a life-long practitioner of conducting major public conflicts and a profound conflict theorist. In short, it could be argued that Gandhi should be viewed from within conflict resolution theory, rather than as being distinct from it. The fact that this is not the case can appear particularly puzzling to those versed in

Gandhian social philosophy who are also familiar with the conflict resolution literature – given its Gandhian 'flavour'.

It would seem to be a reasonable assumption that Gandhi's well-publicized examples of nonviolent resistance and the voluminous writings on his techniques at least set the tone for the later development and phenomenal growth of conflict resolution literature in the guise of modern problem-solving and win-win (as opposed to power-based and zero-sum) approaches leading to integrative conflict resolution (as opposed to mere compromise and distributive outcomes). However, the two bodies of knowledge – concerning Gandhian *satyagraha* and modern conflict resolution theory and its practical application as spelled out in negotiation guidebooks – seem to have developed in mutual ignorance. This raises the issue of how they may enrich the field if they are seen as parts of a larger whole.

***Satyagraha* as the Gandhian Approach to Conflict Resolution**

Satyagraha is Gandhi's technique of nonviolent activism. The term has variously been translated as 'passive resistance', 'nonviolent resistance', 'nonviolent direct action', and even 'militant nonviolence' (Weber, 1991: 2). For Gandhi it was not only a method of conducting conflict, it was also a way of life, of living in Truth.

Galtung (1992: 94–96), echoing Næss (1974: 70–85),¹ summarizes Gandhi's conflict norms in such a way that at least parts of them could almost seem to have given rise to or been derived from the integrative conflict resolution literature. (Other parts go well beyond this literature into the realms of human transcendence.)

The first norm relates to goals and conflicts, and states that one should act in conflicts (now, here, for your own group, out of identity and out of conviction); define the conflict well (state your goals clearly, try to understand the opponent's goals, emphasize common and compatible goals, state conflict relevant facts objectively); and have a positive approach to the conflict (give the conflict a positive emphasis, see it as an opportunity to meet the opponent, as an opportunity to transform society and as an opportunity to transform the self).

The second norm relates to conflict struggle and enjoins one to act nonviolently in conflicts (do not harm or hurt with words, deeds or thoughts, do not damage property, prefer violence to cowardice, do good even to the evil doer); to act in a goal-consistent manner (by including constructive elements, using goal-revealing forms of struggle, acting openly rather than secretly, and by aiming the struggle at the correct point); not to cooperate with evil (do not cooperate with evil structures, status, action or with those who

cooperate with evil); to be willing to sacrifice (by not escaping from punishment and being willing to die if necessary); not to polarize the situation (one should distinguish between antagonisms and antagonists, between persons and status, one should maintain contact with opponents and have empathy for their position, and be flexible in defining parties and positions); not to escalate (by remaining loyal, not provoking the opponent or allowing oneself to be provoked, by not humiliating or allowing oneself to be humiliated, by not expanding the goals of the conflict and by using the mildest forms of conflict behaviour).

The third and final norm relates to conflict resolution, and it directs that conflicts should be solved (do not continue the struggle forever, always seek negotiation, seek positive social transformation and seek transformation of both the self and the opponent); that one should insist on essentials rather than non-essentials (do not trade with essentials, be willing to compromise on non-essentials); that one should see oneself as fallible (be aware that you may be wrong, admit your mistakes, maintain consistency over time); that one should be generous with opponents (do not exploit their weaknesses, do not judge them harder than yourself, trust them); and finally that one should aim for conversion rather than coercion (seek solutions that can be accepted by both you and the opponent, never coerce the opponent, convert the opponent into a believer of the cause, or, as Galtung implies throughout this section, be open to being converted yourself).

Gandhi's own statements readily reflect these principles: 'A *satyagrahi*² must never forget the distinction between evil and the evil-doer' (*Young India*, 8 August 1929);³

² A *satyagrahi* is one practising *satyagraha*.

³ *Indian Opinion*, *Young India* and *Harijan* were newspapers edited by Gandhi and are the major source of his writings. The full articles can be found in the appropriate volumes of Gandhi (1958–1991) at the relevant date.

¹ In turn, both Næss's and Galtung's books are based on their earlier joint book (Galtung & Næss, 1955).

'The essence of non-violence technique is that it seeks to liquidate antagonisms but not antagonists themselves' (*Harijan*, 29 April 1939); 'it is often forgotten that it is never the intention of a Satyagrahi to embarrass the wrong doer'; 'The Satyagrahi's object is to convert, not to coerce, the wrong doer' (*Harijan*, 25 March 1939); 'It is the acid test of non-violence that, in a non-violent conflict, there is no rancour left behind, and in the end the enemies are converted into friends' (*Harijan*, 12 November 1938).

In a conflict situation, for Gandhi, there is no other plan than the adherence to nonviolence in thought, word and deed, and no other goal than to reach the truth (and ultimately the Truth). Because good ends can never grow out of bad means, the opponent (for Gandhi there may be opponents but never enemies) is not forced to expose him or herself to loss. There is ideally no threat, coercion or punishment. Instead, in Gandhi's scheme, the idea is to undergo 'self-suffering' in the belief that the opponent can be converted to seeing the truth by touching his or her conscience, or that a clearer vision of truth may grow out of the dialectical process for both parties.

Conflict Resolution Theory in the Gandhian Literature

A search through the English-language Gandhi literature reveals limited attempts to make the connection with conflict resolution theory. Apart from one book that attempts explicitly to make this link (Weber, 1991), and three others that examine Gandhi's philosophy and praxis of conflict (Bondurant, 1965; Næss, 1974; Galtung, 1992), there appears to be little in the way of other major publications dedicated to the topic. The rest of the literature seems to be limited to a handful of articles in the journal *Gandhi Marg* on the general theme, or at least with titles suggesting that they may relate to the general theme.

A classic in the field of scholarly Gandhian literature, Bondurant's book is subtitled *The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict*. It not only analyses Gandhi's campaigns but also delineates a theoretical background that sounds similar to, and in some aspects goes well beyond, the conflict resolution literature that followed it. Bondurant points out that

The objective is not to assert propositions, but to create possibilities. In opening up new choices and in confronting an opponent with the demand that he make a choice, the *satyagrahi* involves himself in acts of 'ethical existence'. The process forces a continuing examination of one's own motives, an examination undertaken within the context of relationships as they are changed towards a new, restructured, and reintegrated pattern. (Bondurant, 1965: vi–vii)

This dialectical process, she adds, is essentially creative and inherently constructive. Its immediate object is

a restructuring of the opposing elements to achieve a situation which is satisfactory to both the original opposing antagonists but in such a way as to present an entirely new total circumstance . . . through the operation of non-violent action the truth as judged by the fulfilment of human needs will emerge in the form of a mutually satisfactory and agreed-upon solution. (Bondurant, 1965: 195)

This line is clearly echoed in some modern conflict resolution sources that do not mention Gandhi. For example, Burton (1997) sees conflict as inextricably linked with unfulfilled human needs, and Mitchell (1993: 79) sees the aim of problem-solving exercises as a re-analysis of the conflict as a shared problem, as providing alternatives to coercion and 'new options for a generally acceptable and self-sustaining resolution, involving agreement and a new relationship between erstwhile adversaries'. And it is very closely reflected in the still relatively obscure recent approach to conflict resolution called the transformative model (Bush & Folger, 1994).

Among other Western scholars, Arne Næss was greatly influenced by Gandhi (Weber, 1999), but his work on nonviolence and conflict has not had the same impact as his writings on 'deep ecology'. His book *Gandhi and Group Conflict* (1974) systematizes the norms and hypotheses that undergird a Gandhian approach to the resolution of conflict. Some of the propositions include: all human beings have long-term interests in common; violence is invited from opponents if they are humiliated or provoked; opponents are less likely to resort to violence the better they understand your position; the essential interests which opponents have in common should be clearly formulated and cooperation established on that basis; personal contact with the opponent should be sought; opponents should not be judged harder than the self; opponents should be trusted; an unwillingness to compromise on non-essentials decreases the likelihood of true resolution; and a position of weakness in an opponent should not be exploited (Næss, 1974: 60–84).

Næss's ex-pupil and the founder of modern peace research, Johan Galtung, gave us the Gandhi-inspired concept of 'structural violence' (Weber, 1999). He has also written at length on Gandhi and conflict resolution. A manuscript which explores this connection (Galtung, 1971) was never published. A reworked version (Galtung, 1992) did not appear between covers for more than two decades, and then from a relatively little-known Indian peace research institute, almost guaranteeing that it would be unnoticed by Western scholars. In the book, Galtung includes a section on Gandhi and conflict resolution. He lists six approaches to conflict resolution where the incompatibility is eliminated (he lists a further six where the incompatibility is preserved): resolving the incompatibility, compromise, trading, multi-lateralization (taking the conflict out of the frame where it is often stuck), integration,

and decoupling (Galtung, 1992: 84–93). This typology is similar to the ones presented in much of the recent 'guide to' conflict resolution literature, but was written before that literature, and in typical Galtungian fashion is original thought and does not refer to anyone else's work as source material.

Many Indian books on Gandhi's *satyagraha* do have some references that sound as if they come from the same tradition as modern conflict resolution literature. For example, Diwakar points out that in a conflict situation 'while violence to person and property diverts the mind of the parties concerned from the real issues involved, nonviolent action invites the parties to a dialogue about the issues themselves. A common solution of the problem begins to be the objective of both rather than the destruction of each other' (Diwakar, 1969: 25).

Dhawan's early and still major study on Gandhi's political philosophy (Dhawan, 1946) is, however, more typical. While it contains sections on social conflicts, religious conflicts and economic conflicts, the book is really a detailed study of *satyagraha*, and was written while the Mahatma was still alive, well before the advent of modern conflict resolution literature. The terminology, therefore, is quite distinct.

Most contemporary Indian writing in the area does not follow the lead of Bondurant, Næss and Galtung and does not take the literature further than does Dhawan. The quasi-scholarly journal *Gandhi Marg* seems a little more encouraging at first glance, but its articles make few such connections. In a short article, Rath (1986: 857) asserts that Gandhi's *satyagraha* may be 'one of the most viable techniques of conflict resolution', and the author is astonished that this aspect of it 'has not received the attention it deserves'. Although he makes note of Gandhi's stages of conflict resolution (negotiation, followed by self-suffering and nonviolent direct action), this is not related to any modern literature on

the techniques that may facilitate the resolution of conflict. The same is true for other articles with promising titles (e.g. Chandrasekaran, 1990; Mehta, 1991).

Gandhi in the Conflict Resolution Theory and Negotiation Practice Literature

The *Resource Manual for a Living Revolution* (Coover et al., 1981) was an underground classic, widely used by those conducting non-violence training workshops for several years before it was published. The book explores the process of working in groups and living in supportive communities, the techniques of personal growth and consciousness-raising, and is packed with exercises and other information that can be used to foster practical skills. More important, it also contains a chapter on the theoretical basis for change and a sub-chapter on conflict resolution. The chapter, in a section dealing with developing a theory of change, lists Gandhian nonviolence as one of the important social change theories and recommends the studying of case-histories as a way of assisting in the formation of a framework for exploring the theory of social change movements. A reading list of material on Gandhi's campaigns is provided. The section on conflict resolution focuses on 'I-messages', 'active listening', 'brainstorming' and 'no-lose problem-solving processes'. The source of much of this information was the hugely popular *Parent Effectiveness Training* manual (Gordon, 1970). That manual, however, lists as suggested reading books in child psychology, therapy and parenting books, but no Gandhian sources.

The first major 'peace studies' periodical, founded in 1957, the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (*JCR*) seems to be an appropriate place to start a search for Gandhian theory as part of the conflict resolution tradition. However it proves to have a less Gandhi-minded approach than its somewhat less

formal rival *Journal of Peace Research* (*JPR*), especially in the latter's earlier years under its founding editor, Johan Galtung. After the first few issues, there is practically nothing on any potential link with Gandhi in *JCR*. Nevertheless, a content analysis of the journal reveals several important scholarly articles on some of the aspects of the conflict process that would later find their way into the new problem-solving negotiation literature.

The early issues of the journal, not surprisingly, focused on international conflicts, with many articles on arms control, deterrence and international bargaining. Still, it had room for works on interpersonal conflicts and bargaining as well as ones related to Gandhian nonviolence. Over time, nonviolence seems to have become marginalized in the scholarly conflict resolution literature, and during the 1960s *JCR* came to be heavily predisposed towards the publication of game theory-related articles.

However, in its second volume the journal contains articles (Næss, 1958; Deutsch, 1958) which eventually would be incorporated into books on Gandhi and conflict or conflict with a Gandhian flavour (Næss, 1974; Deutsch, 1973). The next volume contains a relevant article (Galtung, 1959), and a review essay on Bondurant's book (Sharp, 1959). Galtung's article states that the antagonist should be separated from the antagonism – a theme common to Gandhian and the 'win-win' conflict resolution literature. In their introduction, the two Norwegian guest editors state that these articles 'seek to clarify some of the issues to be faced in developing research on non-violent alternatives in conflict situations' (Rinde & Rokkan, 1959: 4).

The only other article to deal with Gandhi in *JCR* was a review essay dealing with books on Gandhi (Erikson, 1969) and nonviolent activism (Sharp, 1973). In this article, Lipsitz & Kritzer (1975) suggest that non-violence should be examined more closely as a form of unconventional political action, but rather

than linking it to conflict resolution they suggest that the value of nonviolence lies in its healthy disregard for authority, which is good for democracy, and because it may be a way of getting children out of the habit of group identification.

Although in its early years Galtung contributed theoretical papers on the general theme of nonviolence (e.g. Galtung, 1965), *JPR* tends to deal with actual inter- or intra-national conflicts and pays less attention to conflict resolution theory and negotiation practice in the way that I am looking at them in this article. Only three articles (Pontara, 1965; Klitgaard, 1971; Chatterjee, 1974) deal with approaches to conflict resolution in a manner that might show the applicability of Gandhian techniques to situations involving the conflicting process. Other Gandhi-related articles summarize Gandhian philosophy-in-action (e.g. Bose, 1981), deal with the post-Gandhi Gandhian movement (Hettne, 1976), examine the attitudes of Gandhians to the question of the seeming reality of accommodation as against the ideal of conversion (Nakhare, 1976), or detail Gandhi's influence on the field of peace research (Sørensen, 1992) or on notable individuals in the field (Weber, 1999).

Pontara, in an early and thorough philosophical examination of Gandhi's attitude to violence in extreme group conflict, points out that he makes no detailed attempt to work out the philosophy of conflict which is implicit in Gandhi's writings, and admits that he barely looks at Gandhi's *satyagraha* as an effective substitute for violent methods of conducting social conflict. Klitgaard notes that *satyagraha* as a hard-headed zero-sum bargaining tactic may provide valuable payoffs, but possibly because its underlying principles were compromised or its contradictions glossed over. Although Gandhian tactics may have been ultimately violent (or at least coercive), they may have worked because they were perceived as being nonviolent. However, he also notes

that 'how the game was played, and how the opponent felt about his antagonist after the game was over' also mattered for Gandhi (Klitgaard, 1971: 147). This aspect was not expanded on in the article, but it is at least one of the main links between *satyagraha* and negotiation practice as detailed in the recent problem-solving literature.

Like Klitgaard, Chatterjee attempts to place Gandhian *satyagraha* in a game theory framework (that is one that subsumes a rational strategic context). However, he concludes that *satyagraha* belongs to a class of games 'with threat-vulnerable equilibria', that is, 'where one or the other player is in a position to *induce* the other player to shift but not to *force* him to shift' (Chatterjee, 1974: 28).

Several practically oriented journals with promising titles (for example the *Negotiation Journal* and *Mediation Quarterly*) have appeared in the relatively recent past. So far, Gandhi and Gandhian nonviolence have not been among the subjects they have covered.

The Links Between Gandhi's *Satyagraha* and Modern Conflict Resolution Practice

The words 'conflict resolution' can mean very different things to different people. They are often used synonymously with 'dispute settlement' and 'conflict management'. Pioneering analyst of the position of needs in conflict situations, John Burton sees conflict resolution as a problem-solving exercise that aims at the elimination of the sources of the conflict, not merely the management of the conflict or the settlement (often through coercive power in a way that does not meet the needs of all parties) of the manifest dispute. In short, for Burton, conflicts may be managed and disputes may be settled without conflicts being resolved.

In contrast to an 'adversarial power approach', Burton champions a problem-solving approach which is grounded in his

view of innate human needs, which transcend cultures, and which must be satisfied if deep-seated conflicts are to be resolved. For Burton, the violation of the drives that stem from these needs leads to conflict and crime, while their satisfaction, through problem-solving processes, prevents violence, and conflicts can be resolved by getting to the roots of a problem through a 'searching analysis by all those concerned in the light of which an agreement can be reached without any compromise of human needs' (Burton, 1997: 45).

This collaborative problem-solving approach to conflict resolution seems to have its origins in developments in industrial relations in the 1960s, when the idea arose that more cooperative interaction between the parties could lead to a greater increase in productivity than that which ensued from more traditional forms of power bargaining (Scimecca, 1989: 267–268).⁴ In the mid-1960s, Burton instituted 'international problem-solving workshops' at the Centre for the Analysis of Conflict in London. One of the facilitators at the first workshop (which may have played a part in stopping hostilities between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore), was the Harvard professor of international law Roger Fisher (Scimecca, 1989: 268). Also, around this time, some peace activists turned their attention to peacemaking activities; and dissatisfaction with the costly, slow and adversarial court system led to the development of what has come to be known as the 'alternative dispute resolution' (ADR) movement (Tidwell, 1998: 10–17).

This 'alternative' conflict resolution method grew out of the adjudicative legal tradition and maintained the role of a third

party to determine the outcome in accordance with prevailing norms, and according to theorists like Burton still operated within the power-bargaining frame, with legal or industrial norms determining the outcome. Later in the 1960s a new approach, focusing on human needs, became more fashionable. In this approach, conflicting parties are brought together to analyse the conflict in a non-bargaining way that looks at its deep-rooted sources so that the conflict can be truly 'resolved', rather than creating a situation where merely the manifest dispute is 'settled'. For simple interpersonal disputes, community or neighbourhood justice centres became popular, providing cheap mediation as an alternative to legal and quasi-legal processes.

These developments were gradually moving towards the Gandhian model, and particularly so in the recent non-mainstream approach known as transformative mediation that sees mediation as a process that potentially can change individuals, and through them society, for the better. This approach, very reminiscent of Bondurant's characterization of a Gandhian view of conflict (but again without reference to Gandhi), starts from the premise that conflicts need not be seen as problems in the first place. Instead it suggests that they should be seen as opportunities for moral growth and transformation (Bush & Folger, 1994: 81).

The Gandhian 'Flavour' of Modern Conflict Resolution Literature and Practice

Deutsch (1987: 48), in his work on the differences between constructive and destructive processes in the resolution of conflict, summarized the position as follows:

If one wants to create the conditions for a destructive process of conflict resolution, one would introduce into the conflict the typical characteristics and effects of a competitive

⁴ Another impetus may have been the development of the field of peace research (Laue, 1987: 21). Peace research, in turn, at least in the form given to it by Johan Galtung, was directly influenced by the philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi (Weber, 1999). However, this connection does not seem enough to establish any strong causal link.

process: poor communication; coercive tactics; suspicion; the perception of basic differences in values; an orientation to increasing the power differences; challenges to the legitimacy of the parties and so forth. On the other hand, if one wants to create the conditions for a constructive process of conflict resolution, one would introduce into the conflict the typical effects of a cooperative process: good communication; the perception of similarity in beliefs and values; full acceptance of another's legitimacy; problem-centered negotiations; mutual trust and confidence; information sharing and so forth.

Deutsch (1969: 23) makes the point that in a cooperative context a conflict is seen as a common problem in which the opponents 'have the joint interest of reaching a mutually satisfactory solution'. This process is likely to lead to a productive conflict resolution because 'it aids open and honest communication of relevant information between the participants', reducing misunderstandings 'which can lead to confusion and mistrust'; it tends to limit rather than expand the scope of the conflict by encouraging 'the recognition of legitimacy of each other's interests and of the necessity of searching for a solution which is responsive to the needs of each side'; and 'it leads to a trusting, friendly attitude which increases sensitivity to similarities and common interests, while minimising the salience of differences' (1969: 24). He adds that 'Threat induces defensiveness and reduces the tolerance of ambiguity as well as openness to the new and unfamiliar; excessive tension leads to primitivization and stereo-typing of thought processes' (1969: 22).

Pruitt (1987) also notes several possible outcomes to a negotiation. Where an agreement is reached, the outcome may be the capitulation of one of the parties, or, more positively, the traditional outcome of a compromise, or, most positively, what he calls an 'integrative agreement'. Compromises are reasonable, but not outstanding. Integrative

agreements, on the other hand, resolve parties' interests so that both parties are satisfied. They reconcile the strongest interests of the parties, are more lasting than compromises and strengthen relationships as well as 'improve the chances of finding subsequent integrative agreements' (Pruitt, 1987: 69).

Various studies of individual preferences for methods of conducting conflict appear to indicate that settlement of disputes is easier for individuals to grasp rather than coming to terms with underlying conflicts. For example, LaTour et al. (1976) argue that disputants generally preferred a form of dispute-managing procedure that involved a large degree of third-party intervention rather than individual face-to-face bargaining, which was the least preferred method. It seems that if disputants can put their cases fully they are more comfortable with an impartial third party making a decision for them. Nevertheless, the popular recent practically oriented training books on negotiation practice promise that 'you can get to yes' (Fisher & Ury, 1987), 'you can negotiate anything' (Cohen, 1980), 'you can negotiate with difficult people' (Ury, 1991), that 'I can win and you can win' (Wertheim et al., 1992), in fact that 'everyone can win' (Cornelius & Faire, 1989), and generally that 'win-win solutions' are possible to conflict. These books are self-help manuals that eschew third-party intervention, and they regularly make it onto best-seller lists.

The advice on negotiating techniques leading to integrative agreements that these books dispense must have some empirical basis. However, as a rule they provide anecdotal evidence rather than referenced sources and in fact 'show little evidence of attention to ongoing, empirical research' (Weiss-Wik, 1983: 707), let alone any connection with Gandhi. Nevertheless, if we look at popular negotiation manuals we find many propositions that are backed up by empirical research and Gandhian 'flavoured' statements. For

example, the phenomenally successful book *Getting to Yes* (Fisher & Ury, 1987) promotes what the authors call 'principled negotiation' and suggests that in this method

you look for mutual gains wherever possible, and where your interests conflict, you should insist that the result be based on some fair standards independent of the will of either side. The method of principled negotiation is hard on the merits, soft on the people. It employs no tricks and no posturing. Principled negotiation shows you how to obtain what you are entitled to and still be decent. It enables you to be fair while protecting you against those who would take advantage of your fairness. (Fisher & Ury, 1987: xii)

And, 'separating the people from the problem allows you to deal directly and empathetically with the other negotiator as a human being, thus making possible an *amicable* agreement' (Fisher & Ury, 1987: 14).

A plethora of these 'how to do it guide books' appeared in the late 1970s and early 1980s. While they tend not to contain a bibliography of their sources, the bargaining strategies of the practice they describe must be based at least partly on uncredited theoretical experimental literature. And in many instances the conclusions of this literature are relatively obvious to those who have studied Gandhi's thoughts on interpersonal conflict or been involved in nonviolent activism.

Weiss-Wik, in an examination of six popular 'self-help' negotiation manuals, distills their common guidelines for successful negotiations. He lists them as the adoption of a win-win outlook; incorporating the need to prepare for the negotiation by planning, studying the situation, setting objectives, establishing priorities, and plotting the course of action; concentrating on the negotiators' needs and employing a problem-solving approach to ensure that they are met; considering sources of power and implementing appropriate tactics; endeavouring to communicate adroitly so that areas of common concern are pinpointed, underlying

intentions discovered, basic assumptions and understandings checked and misinterpretations minimized; demonstrating a willingness to cooperate and adapt by showing that a win-win solution is sought and the desire for one conveyed; and finalizing agreements clearly so that they 'are definite enough to promote commitment and compliance' (Weiss-Wik, 1983: 715-716). In short, the basic approach of these (and many later) self-help manuals is to attempt to achieve win-win solutions by separating the people from the problem. Problems and their solution, rather than the defeat of enemies, becomes the goal. The books recognize the compelling nature of needs and instruct their readers to focus on interests rather than positions.

Some scholars, however, have pointed out potential dilemmas involved in this integrative approach. Stating one's position in terms of problems to be solved, rather than terms to be accepted, and remaining open to possible solutions that may present themselves in negotiation means that there cannot be commitment to a position that is most favourable to one's own interest. Further, providing the opponent with an accurate picture of one's needs precludes the tactic of preventing the opponent from learning in advance one's bottom line (Pruitt, 1972: 141). These dilemmas notwithstanding, many of the steps in this process are corroborated by the research literature as being efficacious in promoting successful bargaining outcomes.

The empirical conflict resolution literature points out that the need to 'save face' plays a large part in shaping negotiating behaviour (Brown, 1968; Swingle, 1970: 267); Weiss-Wik (1983: 719) concludes that the studies seem to indicate that 'face-related responses' in conflict situations 'generally project resistance and increased competitiveness toward the experimental other'. Although Rubin & Brown (1975: 155) found that frequency of cooperation and size

of outcomes increased when intangible needs (such as those for self-esteem) were converted into tangible ones, Weiss-Wik, after examining the empirical evidence, was able to conclude that 'If a negotiator concentrates on satisfying his counterpart's intangible needs, that would seem to be all for the better', and that 'needs lend themselves to a greater number of solutions than do positions' (1983: 720).

The manuals advocate focusing on similarities, on drawing out interdependence by looking to problems rather than positions. Rubin & Brown (1975: 202–206) note that the most effective bargaining was achieved when goals and orientations were formulated cooperatively. The manuals also claim that issues can be successfully worked through when they are treated as problems that need to be solved. On this aspect Weiss-Wik (1983: 722) concludes that 'several aspects of integrative bargaining . . . inform the trainers' recommendations to concentrate on needs'.

Some studies, however, posit toughness, with extreme initial demands, few concessions and an unyielding position as the most advantageous strategy (Siegel & Fouraker, 1960; Bartos, 1970: 65). Further, Rubin & Brown (1975: 267) found that subjects in experimental studies achieved better outcomes with extreme rather than moderate initial positions, and Komorita & Brenner (1968) found that in some cases the probability of reaching an agreement was lowered if bargainers began with the positions they eventually expected to settle upon. This may be because extreme positions show that one will not allow oneself to be exploited (Rubin & Brown, 1975: 268).

In contrast to the above, a study by Wilson & Bixenstine (1964) indicated that unjustified insult, unfair reduction of one party's outcomes by an opponent, or other behaviour posing a threat or damage to 'face' usually resulted in retaliation and mutual loss

rather than cooperative effort. This experiment indicates that when negotiators have been made to look foolish and weak before important audiences, they are likely to retaliate against those causing the humiliation. And this may occur despite the knowledge that 'doing so may require the sacrifice of all or large portions of the available outcomes' (Brown, 1968: 119). Likewise, Siegel & Fouraker (1960: 100) concluded from the results of their experiments that 'Some negotiations collapse when one party becomes incensed at the other, and henceforth strives to maximize his opponent's displeasure rather than his own satisfaction.' Where demands are seen as excessive, giving in to them may be viewed as tantamount to appeasement, and this may be seen as disadvantageous because appeasement 'would only encourage them to make even stronger demands' (Tedeschi & Rosenfeld, 1980: 241).

On the question of threats, Weiss-Wik (1983: 727) concludes that the authors of the negotiation manuals and most of the researchers concur that they are inappropriate for successful, that is win-win, negotiation outcomes. 'An overwhelming amount of experimental research shows that threats tend to elicit counterthreats, which then draw in competitive pressure, concern over restoring face, and hostility. The conflict spirals' (Weiss-Wik, 1983: 728).

Despite his finding that 'those who were tough tended to receive a higher payoff than those who were soft', Bartos (1970: 65) explained that 'the main reason for this was the fact that toughness in the bargaining situation did *not* impede progress towards an agreement too seriously' because it was of style. Where toughness becomes 'positional commitment' rather than style, negotiations tend to break down. Being tough, even where there is no subjective positional commitment, can have another drawback: it can be perceived as unfair and unfair demands will be rejected.

Diesing (1961: 369) maintains that good relationships make genuine agreements possible, whereas if the relationship is bad 'chances of agreement are missed through misunderstanding, energies are absorbed in useless belligerency, and dealings are distorted by attempts to retaliate for imagined past injustices and insults'. Presumably because of such factors, the manuals also stress the use of appropriate bargaining tactics. This means being cautious about employing extremely tough strategies and avoiding the use of threats.

Bartos (1977) presents the hypothesis that negotiators view the midpoint between their offers and demands as just, and strive to reach it, and consequently negotiations only proceed smoothly as long as there is a collectivist desire for fairness (i.e. cooperation). The reason negotiators do not zero in on the agreement they eventually expect to reach is because this may lead to exploitation by the opponent. Bartos, therefore, recommends that negotiators be scrupulously fair and avoid the temptation to take advantage of opponents, because a tough stance may result in larger early concessions but eventually opponents will discover that they are being treated unfairly and then become tough themselves, leading to deadlocks or breakdowns in negotiations.

When pressure tactics are employed in a conflict situation, they are generally incompatible with the aim of persuading the adversary to make concessions, and such tactics actually subvert the aim of a productive conflict resolution (Pruitt, 1972: 136; Deutsch & Krauss, 1960: 188). Further, while tactics that centre on bluffing and deceitful statements may be successful in the short term and in one-off bargaining sequences, 'they are likely to backfire in the long run and across a series of bargaining sessions because of the distrust that is generated. Once one learns that a player continually bluffs and misrepresents his or her hand in a poker game, these

tactics lose their effectiveness' (Tedeschi & Rosenfeld, 1980: 232).

When focusing on 'adroit communication', the negotiation manuals employ techniques that go under the names of 'bilateral focus', 'role reversal', 'active listening' and 'restatement'. These techniques are intended to improve understanding, increase trust and promote the compatibility of goals. Looking at the research literature, Weiss-Wik (1983: 730) finds that they do not appear to be 'a uniformly beneficial type of communication'; however, he adds that some experiments (reported in Tedeschi & Rosenfeld, 1980: 231, following Schelling, 1960) have shown that negotiators who know their opponent's bargaining range ('utility schedule') 'conceded more than uninformed ones because their norms of fairness came into play and restrained their demands' (Weiss-Wik, 1983: 732), so as not to exploit an advantage. In fact, the research seems to indicate that negotiators will conduct themselves in ways consistent with their values and ethical standards of behaviour, and that pointing out that a certain course of action will allow the opponent to act in accordance with a higher code of conduct is a powerful negotiating tool (Lewicki et al., 1994: 209).

Weiss-Wik (1983: 734) sums up the problem-solving studies he examined by noting that they 'do lend some support to trainers' prescriptions. They more or less argue for defining the problems in negotiation, searching for and evaluating solutions, and making decisions.' As a final conclusion, he is only able to admit that the 'verbal style of the successful negotiator as prescribed by trainers currently lies beyond directly relevant, empirical criticism'.

Patchen (1987: 182), in his examination of the literature and studies of the best strategy to use in order to get another party (and this can refer to anyone from individuals to nations) to cooperate rather than to try to win an advantage, claims that there is a

'remarkable convergence of findings'. It appears that 'a policy of unconditional cooperation tends to bring exploitation by an adversary whereas a policy of consistent co-erciveness tends to lead to a fight'. However, it seems that a strategy that begins with firmness, including a threat, coercion, and then moves to conciliation, will be effective in securing cooperation from opponents.

Some studies in the conflict resolution literature, for example that of Shure, Meeker & Hansford (1965), found that those (at least in laboratory studies) who employed pacifist strategies (that is those by ethically motivated cooperators who rejected violence and coercion and instead aimed for conversion) in bargaining were not successful. Although pacifists tried to get their opponents to see the unfairness of their claims and the immorality of their actions, and tried to establish their own personal resolve and give assurance that all their actions were in good faith, a favourable image of the pacifist was not enough for an effective appeal. Dominators did not become cooperators because of the pacifist tactics, and such tactics could even invite exploitation and aggression. And, similarly, Deutsch et al. (1967) found that a 'turn the other cheek' strategy was not successful in eliciting cooperation – it was in fact more likely to be exploited.

This, at first glance, seems to go against a strategy that one could consider Gandhian. Nevertheless, some other studies clearly seem to support this less immediate version of 'martyrdom pays'. Braver & Van Rohrer (1975: 653), for example, have found that 'subjects most often will cooperate if they have reason to believe their opponent will be benevolent'. This, however, does not seem to work between martyrs and their exploiters (because easily exploited martyrs *are* exploited), but what the authors call a martyr strategy does 'evoke a high degree of cooperation from a later opponent who observes the martyrdom'. To the exploiters the martyrs

gave the appearance of being 'suckers', but observers are moved by martyrdom and tend to treat martyrs with kindness.

This is backed up by Reychler (1979: 257), who found that a pacifist strategy tends to be most effective in reducing violence and exploitative behaviour when the human distance between the opponents and subject is small, the subject is well informed of the pacifist's strategy, the subject is required to justify his or her behaviour after the fact and when a third party is present. Pacifist strategies, and this is the key aim of Gandhian praxis, force an opponent to choose between morality and self-interest. And 'the strongest predictor of the effectiveness of the pacifist strategy is the image of the pacifist held by the subject'. Lewicki et al. (1994: 217) conclude that 'A negotiator's reputation plays a critical role in how persuasive she will be: those with better reputations will be more persuasive, especially in the long term'; they add that being 'nice and pleasant is a logical step in being more persuasive' (1994: 219).

Some conflict studies, however, point out that this playing to a third-party audience can cut both ways. The social embarrassment of admitting to a moral error may increase the intractability of an opponent (Meeker & Shure, 1969).

Rapoport (1960), in an old but still useful typology, classifies disputes in terms of fights (attempted mutual coercion, where the object is to harm the enemy), games (where the object is to outwit the competitor) or debates (where the object is to convert the potential ally, to come to a win-win solution, in short to resolve the conflict). This classification ranks conflicts in order of increasing resolution potential and with an increasing level of humanity of the conflicting parties. Debates can involve the assistance of third parties or they can be based in face-to-face negotiation. For a debate, the opponent must be heard and understood, and they must know that they have been heard; the areas of

validity in the opponent's stand must be delineated, and an assumption of similarity should be induced (Rapoport, 1960: 286–287). The best method of doing this is to state the opponent's case back to them, for 'To make a dent in the opponent's armor, you must make him listen, and something he is sure to listen to is his own case' (1960: 291).

This means that opponents should not be threatened, and a relationship of trust and mutual responsiveness should be built up. It is easier to move from cooperation to competition than from competition to cooperation, so trust needs to be built early in the relationship. This is particularly important because approaches to trust can create self-fulfilling prophecies (Lewicki et al., 1994: 336; Axelrod, 1984). Trust-building can be done by showing a positive interest in the opponents' welfare and demonstrating a readiness to respond helpfully to their needs and requests. Of course trust can be exploited, but too often conflicts are conducted on the assumption that if parties are not sufficiently tough they *will* be exploited. There is risk, but the risk is less than the risk of the loss of a mutually acceptable resolution that would result from the use of pressure tactics.

Gandhi's *Satyagraha* and Conflict Resolution

Tidwell (1998: xi) claims that not all conflicts can be or should be resolved, some should be won. Gandhian *satyagraha*, at least at a theoretical level, rejects this on at least two grounds. First, in Gandhi's approach, attempts should be made to resolve all conflicts and attempts should be made to convert all opponents so that the parties end up 'on the same side'. If, however, this is not possible, it provides a way of fighting for justice that minimizes the possibility of excluding the chance of later conversion taking place. Second, while winning is not totally rejected

(after all Gandhi wanted his immediate goal of freedom for India to prevail, albeit without humiliation for the opponent), the main aim of conducting conflict may be something beyond winning or losing, or even beyond a win-win resolution of the dispute at hand – it may have more to do with an existential transformation of the individuals involved.

Tidwell (1998: 17) further claims that the values that inform conflict resolution, that is nonviolence, fairness, individual choice and empowerment, as well as the support for a variety of fundamental principles such as human rights, common sense or human needs, are essentially Western in nature. Gandhi's philosophy has come to epitomize many of these values, and his method of conducting conflict can only partly be said to result from his interaction with Western culture and philosophy. This, therefore, may indicate that rather than inhibiting 'its useful application across cultural and political barriers' it may demonstrate the universality of at least some of these values.

Those engaged in a conflict, and wanting to conduct the process in Gandhian terms, would look to the following propositions as givens (Næss, 1974: 70–85; Weber, 1991: 36–39).

First, violence is invited from opponents if they are humiliated or provoked.

Second, a violent attitude is less likely on the part of a would-be *satyagrahi* if he or she makes clear to him or herself the essential elements of the case and the purpose of the conflict. The sincere undertaking of a conflict along Gandhian lines requires an affirmative answer to the question: 'Is my motive when starting this new direct action unmixed – is it just to realise the goal of the campaign, and not *also* to wish to injure the opponent or due to other deviant motive?' (Næss, 1974: 104).

Third, opponents should be provided with a full understanding of one's case and conduct. According to Pelton (1974: 86), because nonviolent persuasion is based on the 'straight-

forward dissemination of information', the 'packaging' of issues by withholding information or making unsubstantiated charges, and by appealing to greed, prejudice or hatred, 'cannot under any circumstances be reconciled with the philosophy of nonviolence'.

Fourth, the essential interests which opponents have in common should be clearly formulated and cooperation established on this basis. Gandhi points out that when we put ourselves in our opponents' shoes we will do them justice and most of the 'miseries and misunderstandings in the world will disappear' (*Young India*, 19 March 1925).

Fifth, opponents should not be judged harder than the self: 'An opponent is entitled to the same regard for his principles as we would expect others to have for ours' (*Harijan*, 4 May 1940). In other words, Gandhi believes that love must be shown to opponents and that the way to do this is to give them the same credit for honesty as we would claim for ourselves. He notes that tolerance is important because 'we will never all think alike and we shall see Truth in fragment and from different angles of vision'. As conscience differs between individuals, while it may be a guide for immediate conduct, 'imposition of that conduct upon all will be an insufferable interference with everyone's freedom of conscience' (*Young India*, 23 September 1926).

Sixth, opponents should be trusted. While it has been noted above that some studies have shown that trusting behaviour may lead to exploitation rather than cooperation, these experiments did not factor in the very important subjective and larger societal payoffs (in the Gandhian scheme) that come from living by one's personal morality (Pelton, 1974: 22–25).

Seventh, an unwillingness to compromise on non-essentials decreases the likelihood of converting the opponent. For Gandhi, demands made must be of the 'irreducible minimum', and they should never be lowered

just to please the adversary (Bose, 1972: 115). However, one should be prepared to 'make large concessions on all points except where a principle is involved' (Gandhi, 1928: 245); in fact, in cases short of matters of principle 'A *satyagrahi* never misses, can never miss, a chance of compromise on honourable terms' (*Young India*, 16 April 1931). Nevertheless, Bondurant (1965: 197) points out that the Gandhian process of conflict is one of synthesis rather than compromise. The Gandhian practitioner of conflict is never prepared to yield a position which he or she holds to be the truth, but 'he may be persuaded that he is in error in so holding them' (1965: 220).

Eighth, the conversion of an opponent is furthered by personal sincerity.

Ninth, the best way of convincing an opponent of sincerity is to make sacrifices for the given cause.

Tenth, a position of weakness in an opponent should not be exploited, and advantage should not be taken of an opponent's weak moments 'if they have not been the result of *satyagraha*, but due to extraneous reasons' (Bose, 1972: 116). By the same token, however, *satyagrahis* 'could not give up their objective if they found their strength dwindling away' (Gandhi, 1928: 412).

Besides the obvious moral reason, such weakness should not be exploited because surrender caused by some misfortune suffered by the opponent making it necessary to call off the struggle may leave them, after their capitulation, as opposed to the settlement as they were before their hand was forced. Surrender without conversion is not the ideal Gandhian way of terminating a struggle. Conversely, the demonstration of good will by not taking advantage of an opponent's position may induce them to trust one's sincerity and 'prepare a suitable atmosphere for a settlement' (Næss, 1974: 104).

The above points, gleaned from Gandhi's

writings and personal experience, are very reminiscent of the key concepts put forward by the self-help negotiation manuals as the main components of achieving win-win solutions. But the Gandhian conflict process also goes well beyond conflict resolution to integration (or transformation) at a deeper level.

Galtung and Næss clearly make the point that for Gandhi the aim of the process of conflict was not merely to reach a resolution in the sense that it is advocated in the negotiation practice/training manuals. For the Mahatma the process was about the achievement of self-realization, nothing less. For him the fundamental principle was that of the unity of existence (or more immediately, unity of humans). People are related to each other in a way that has a transcendental nature, and conflict should be seen as a gift providing a rich opportunity, potentially to the benefit of all (Galtung, 1992: 62), to realize a higher self.

Galtung (1992: 63) notes that social scientists see conflicting parties as having differing perceptions of the conflict, sometimes wrong perceptions. The heat of conflict may dim or distort visions, and therefore third parties with objective unclouded visions may be needed to achieve resolution. For Gandhi, as interpreted by Galtung, things are different. While mediators may play an important role in helping parties come to a mutually acceptable agreement, generally third-party intervention should be rejected and the conflict viewed 'as a medium through which the parties can develop a higher degree of awareness of themselves as well as of the other party'. This is because resolution is only one element of the desired outcome of the conflict. Others, equally or even more desirable as criteria of success, include a new social structure and a 'higher level of self-purification in both actors' (Galtung, 1992: 88).

According to Gandhian practice, in order

for needs to be met they must first be understood, and this requires true self-awareness. For Gandhi the discovery of Self was the primary task of life. As noted above, however, parties to a conflict often preferred third-party intervention to being totally responsible for the disputing process. This is perhaps understandable, but it depends on what the desired outcome of the process is – a settlement of this dispute, the resolution of any underlying conflict, or, in Gandhian terms, achieving the dignity that comes from taking responsibility for the self, and thus aiding in the understanding of Self.

Debates, or negotiations, in the Gandhian ideal are bilateral; the two parties are themselves the decision-makers. This reduces the dependence on experts but, as others have argued, such independence can be frightening for those without skills or clear insights into their own needs. In Gandhian terms mere dispute settlement does little to answer fundamental life questions. Taking personal responsibility for negotiation, rather than assigning the process to arbitrators or adjudicators, offers an increased opportunity for personal growth by exposing parties to the views of the other, and provides the opportunity for deep self-reflection. It takes the process beyond the immediate dispute. The manuals also champion a bilateral approach. Even if the reason for this is more about cost than empowerment, and certainly not self-realization (but as noted above it should be about being decent, according to Fisher & Ury, 1987), the approaches do have marked similarities. It should be noted here that the more recent literature on conflict transformation (e.g. Bush & Folger, 1994) attempts to place mediators specifically within this paradigm and notes that this is the unfulfilled 'promise of mediation'.

While the findings and arguments that martyrdom tactics do not generally lead to successful conflict outcomes, and seem to contradict Gandhi's dictum that self-suffering

would melt the stoniest heart, nonviolence theorists have long taken this knowledge into account (Pelton, 1974: 135, 140, 143) and demonstrated that Gandhian nonviolence does work in conflict situations, albeit in more subtle ways. The Gandhian literature acknowledges that conversion may not come by such direct methods but may rely on conversion of third parties who in turn push the opponent into behavioural change.

Rogers (1961) notes that life can become existentially dysfunctional if it is 'incongruent', and this, at some stage will force change in individual behaviour. In a conflict situation, this incongruence is most likely to be initiated by being out of step with third parties who are in a close social relationship with the actors (Galtung, 1989: 20–21, 25; Weber, 1993). If one can influence an audience at a closer social distance to the opponent or alter public opinion – the milieu in which opponents must live – there is a fair chance of influencing their attitude even when there has been no opportunity for direct communication. Gandhi, quite candidly, claimed that 'the method of reaching the heart is to awaken public opinion. Public opinion, for which one cares, is a mightier force than that of gunpowder' (*Young India*, 19 March 1925). And this may help opponents to clearer insights into their own motivation and sense of belonging in a larger reality.

In short, conducting conflict in what can be termed a Gandhian context may not only be instrumentally valuable but may be intrinsically important in an existential sense.

Conclusion

For many Indian scholars, Gandhi is the 'Father of the Nation', and their examination of Gandhi's techniques tends to relate to political activism and the freedom struggle. Not surprisingly, it is the Western analysts of Gandhian thought who have undertaken

what little exploration there has been of Gandhi's *satyagraha* in terms of conflict resolution.

Gandhi's writings often refer to arbitration and even judicial adjudication as ways of resolving conflicts. It must be remembered, however, that much of his energy was taken up with opposing large-scale violent ethnic and religious conflicts, and in these situations anything that could calm passions was welcome. Given that the Mahatma had died decades before the advent of the alternative dispute resolution movement or before conflict resolution literature had brought some sense of order to the terminology used in the field, it is not surprising that he used the term 'mediation' interchangeably with 'arbitration'.

The Gandhian process of conflict-solving sees the appearance of a case in an adjudicative tribunal as a failure of the parties to settle the dispute and emerge as the friends the model aims at. Adjudication generally precludes the Gandhian dialectic from ever coming into play between the opponents. Although it may be a truism, it must be realized that individuals often see no other choice open to them than to go to the police or a lawyer owing to mistrust of the other disputant and/or a general feeling of impotence in being able to carry out their own negotiations. Even when a dispute is in the hands of lawyers a settlement may be reached short of actual adjudication, but rarely will one party see the other's point of view and have undergone a process of 'conversion', thereby removing the source of future such disagreements and the possible need for ensuing litigation (Weber, 1986).

The modern ADR movement has established a system aimed at avoiding legal adjudication and giving disputants a measure of control over the outcome of disputes in something of a Gandhian spirit through the good offices of a mediator. It is the mediator's job to assist the parties to come to their own

resolution of their dispute (Deutsch, 1973: 382–388). There is no power to compel settlement; the disputants must rely on their own mutual agreement with assistance from the mediator and, because it is in their interest, they themselves make settlements work. While the outcome sought is an accommodation between the parties, it could lead to the conversion aimed at by *satyagraha* and so come close to the Gandhian ideal. In other words, this level of third-party involvement is not totally outside the parameters of the ideal Gandhian conflicting process, as adjudication or even arbitration would be. After all, Gandhi himself took pride in being a third-party assistant in so many disputes that he could say that ‘a large part of my time during the twenty years of my practice as a lawyer was occupied in bringing about private compromises of hundreds of cases’, and ‘that the true function of a lawyer was to unite parties riven asunder’ (Gandhi, 1940: 97; also Weber, 1986: 695–697). In short, while the Gandhian conflict process is generally seen as a bilateral one, Gandhi himself may have perceived a role for mediators similar to the one advocated by the champions of transformative conflict resolution as aiding in a spiritually and morally enriching process by not merely going beyond issues of power and rights, but even those of interests, to ones of relatedness (Dukes, 1993: 50).

In this vein, Bush & Folger (1994: xv) have recently argued that mediation has the potential to do more than produce agreements and improve relationships. They go so far as to argue that it can transform people’s lives. They make the very Gandhian point that conflict affords opportunity for moral development and that the role of the mediator is not only to find solutions to problems but also ‘to change people themselves for the better’; they complain that this potential has largely been overlooked.

Bush & Folger (1994: 2) see this transformative process coming about through two

effects: empowerment (giving disputing parties a sense of ‘their own value and strength and their own capacity to handle life’s problems’) and recognition (generating feelings of ‘empathy for the situation and problems of others’). Recently this approach has been utilized in victim/offender mediations, but perhaps its value has not been taken as far as it could be. Some theorists feel that the transformative dimensions of mediation, that is, empowerment and recognition, matter more than the settlement, not only because of their intrinsic value but also ‘as expressions of a much broader shift to a new moral and social vision’ (1994: 4).

Although role-plays by nonviolent activists, in preparation for involvement in situations of direct physical conflict, may explore the use of creative suffering, no one has yet devised techniques of conflict resolution or negotiation practice that are so specifically Gandhian as to place a large emphasis on self-suffering. Perhaps this is not possible or even thought to be desirable; however, the shift from a model of conflict resolution that was traditionally based on power and coercive bargaining to one of problem-solving processes that aimed to resolve conflicts (rather than merely settle immediate disputes) seems to have produced conflict resolution processes with strong similarities to the preliminary phases of Gandhi’s *satyagraha*, and some new theoretical thinking about the broader dimensions of approaches to conflict has strong parallels with Gandhi’s quest for an existentially more satisfying life.

In Gandhi’s vision *satyagraha* was not only a useful technique for the resolution of conflicts, and the *satyagrahi* was far more than a mere practitioner of a certain skill. The *satyagrahi* was the embodiment of an ideal, and the *satyagrahi* lifestyle was the lifestyle worth living. In claiming that a person’s ‘highest duty in life is to serve mankind and take his share in bettering its condition’ (*Indian*

Opinion, 23 February 1907), Gandhi was making the point that the ultimate congruence of the self and the other means that the 'highest form of morality' is the practice of altruism. While self-suffering was quite likely to be a consequence of altruism, Gandhi was firmly convinced that to suffer wrongs was less degrading than to inflict them.

Although none of the authors of the popular books espousing the new win-win models acknowledge any debt to Gandhi, and although it seems that the theoretical work on which this new literature is based cannot be causally linked to Gandhi's *satyagraha*, the two bodies of knowledge are complementary in principles and goals. Further, the empirical literature, while not going as far as Gandhian theory, does seem to provide reasonably strong backing for the validity of the Gandhian approach to conflict resolution that grew out of a lifetime of conducting conflict and seeking Truth for the Mahatma. Practitioners and popularizers of both disciplines could gain much by realizing that they are in fact part of the same discourse. They could profitably read that part of the literature that is unfamiliar to them in order to help them better conceptualize conflict resolution. And perhaps skilled mediators could consider whether, consistent with Gandhi's approach, there may be a broader normative and transformative dimension in their search for integrative agreements.

References

- Axelrod, Robert, 1984. *The Evolution of Cooperation*. New York: Basic Books.
- Bartos, Otomar J., 1970. 'Determinants and Consequences of Toughness', in Paul G. Swingle, ed., *The Structure of Conflict*. New York: Academic Press (45–68).
- Bartos, Otomar J., 1977. 'Simple Model of Negotiation: A Sociological Point of View', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 21(4): 565–579.
- Bondurant, Joan V., 1965. *Conquest of Violence: The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Bose, Amina, 1981. 'A Gandhian Perspective on Peace', *Journal of Peace Research* 18(2): 159–164.
- Bose, Nirmal Kumar, 1972. *Studies in Gandhism*. Ahmedabad: Navajivan.
- Braver, Sanford L. & Van Rohrer, 1975. 'When Martyrdom Pays: The Effects of Information Concerning the Opponent's Past Game Behaviour', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 19(4): 652–662.
- Brown, Bert R., 1968. 'The Effects of Need to Maintain Face in the Outcome of Interpersonal Bargaining', *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 4(1): 107–121.
- Burton, John W., 1997. *Violence Explained: The Sources of Conflict, Violence and Crime and their Prevention*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Bush, Robert A. Baruch & Joseph P. Folger, 1994. *The Promise of Mediation: Responding to Conflict Through Empowerment and Recognition*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
- Chandrasekaran, A., 1990. 'Gandhian Techniques of Conflict Resolution [International Politics]', *Gandhi Marg* 11(4): 470–474.
- Chatterjee, Bishwa B., 1974. 'Search for an Appropriate Game Model for Gandhian Satyagraha', *Journal of Peace Research* 11(1): 21–29.
- Cohen, Herb, 1980. *You Can Negotiate Anything*. Secaucus, NJ: Lyle Stuart.
- Coover, Virginia; Ellen Deacon, Charles Esser & Christopher Moore, 1981. *Resource Manual for a Living Revolution*. Philadelphia, PA: New Society.
- Cornelius, Helena & Shoshana Faire, 1989. *Everyone Can Win: How to Resolve Conflict*. Sydney: Simon & Schuster.
- Deutsch, Morton, 1958. 'Trust and Suspicion', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 2(4): 265–279.
- Deutsch, Morton, 1969. 'Conflicts: Productive and Destructive', *Journal of Social Issues* 25(1): 4–41.
- Deutsch, Morton, 1973. *The Resolution of Conflict: Constructive and Destructive Processes*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Deutsch, Morton, 1987. 'A Theoretical Perspective on Conflict and Conflict Resolution', in Dennis

- J. D. Sandole & Ingrid Sandole-Staroste, eds, *Conflict Management and Problem Solving: Interpersonal to International Applications*. New York: New York University Press (38–49).
- Deutsch, Morton & Robert M. Krauss, 1960. 'Effect of Threat on Interpersonal Bargaining', *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 61(2): 181–189.
- Deutsch, Morton; Yakov Epstein, Donnah Canavan & Peter Gumpert, 1967. 'Strategies of Inducing Cooperation: An Experimental Study', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 11(3): 345–360.
- Dhawan, Gopinath, 1946. *The Political Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi*. Bombay: Popular Book Depot.
- Diesing, Paul, 1961. 'Bargaining Strategy and Union–Management Relationships', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 5(4): 369–378.
- Diwakar, R. R., 1969. *Saga of Satyagraha*. New Delhi: Gandhi Peace Foundation.
- Dukes, Frank, 1993. 'Public Conflict Resolution: A Transformative Approach', *Negotiation Journal* 9(1): 45–57.
- Erikson, Erik H., 1969. *Gandhi's Truth: On the Origins of Militant Nonviolence*. New York: Norton.
- Fisher, Roger & William Ury, 1987 [1981]. *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In*. London: Arrow.
- Galtung, Johan, 1959. 'Pacifism from a Sociological Point of View', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 3(1): 67–84.
- Galtung, Johan, 1965. 'On the Meaning of Non-violence', *Journal of Peace Research* 2(3): 228–257.
- Galtung, Johan, 1971. 'Gandhi and Conflictology', in *Papers: A Collection of Works Previously Available Only in Manuscript or Very Limited Circulation Mimeographed or Photocopied Editions*. Vol. 5: *Papers in English 1968–1972*. Oslo: PRIO, 1980 (107–138).
- Galtung, Johan, 1989. *Nonviolence and Israel/Palestine*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- Galtung, Johan, 1992. *The Way is the Goal: Gandhi Today*. Ahmedabad: Gujarat Vidyapith Peace Research Centre.
- Galtung, Johan & Arne Næss, 1955. *Gandhis Politiske Etik* [Gandhi's Political Ethics]. Oslo: Tanum.
- Gandhi, M. K., 1928. *Satyagraha in South Africa*. Madras: G. Natesan.
- Gandhi, M. K., 1940. *An Autobiography or The Story of My Experiments With Truth*. Ahmedabad: Navajivan.
- Gandhi, M. K., 1958–1991. *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, vols.1–100. New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India. [CD ROM version, 1999. New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India.]
- Gordon, Thomas, 1970. *P.E.T.: Parent Effectiveness Training*. New York: Peter H. Wyden.
- Hettne, Bjørn, 1976. 'The Vitality of Gandhian Tradition', *Journal of Peace Research* 3(2): 227–245.
- Ingram, Catherine, 1990. *In the Footsteps of Gandhi*. Berkeley, CA: Parallax.
- Klitgaard, Robert E., 1971. 'Gandhi's Non-Violence as a Tactic', *Journal of Peace Research* 8(2): 143–153.
- Komorita, S. S. & Arline R. Brenner, 1968. 'Bargaining and Concession-Making Under Bilateral Monopoly', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 9(1):15–20.
- LaTour, Stephen; Pauline Houlden, Laurens Walker & John Thibaut, 1976. 'Some Determinants of Preference for Modes of Conflict Resolution', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 20(2): 319–356.
- Laue, James, 1987. 'The Emergence and Institutionalization of Third Party Roles in Conflict', in Dennis J. D. Sandole & Ingrid Sandole-Staroste, eds, *Conflict Management and Problem Solving: Interpersonal to International Applications*. New York: New York University Press (17–29).
- Lewicki, Roy J.; Joseph A. Litterer, John W. Minton & David M. Saunders, 1994. *Negotiation*. Chicago: Irwin.
- Lipsitz, Lewis & Herbert M. Kritzer, 1975. 'Unconventional Approaches to Conflict Resolution: Erikson and Sharp on Nonviolence', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 19(4): 713–733.
- Meeker, Robert J. & Gerald H. Shure, 1969. 'Pacifist Bargaining Tactics: Some "Outsider" Influences', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 13(4): 487–493.

- Mehta, Geeta, 1991. 'Gandhi and Conflict Resolution', *Gandhi Marg* 12(4): 477-482.
- Mitchell, Christopher, R., 1993. 'Problem-Solving Exercises and Theories of Conflict Resolution', in Dennis J. D. Sandole & Hugo van der Merwe, eds, *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application*. Manchester: Manchester University Press (78-94).
- Næss, Arne, 1958. 'A Systematization of Gandhian Ethics of Conflict Resolution', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 2(4): 140-155.
- Næss, Arne, 1974. *Gandhi and Group Conflict: An Exploration of Satyagraha*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
- Nakhare, Amrut, 1976. 'Meaning of Nonviolence: A Study of Satyagrahi Attitudes', *Journal of Peace Research* 13(3): 185-196.
- Patchen, Martin, 1987. 'Strategies for Eliciting Cooperation from an Adversary: Laboratory and International Findings', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 31(1): 164-185.
- Pelton, Leroy, 1974. *The Psychology of Non-Violence*. New York: Pergamon.
- Pontara, Giuliano, 1965. 'The Rejection of Violence in Gandhian Ethics of Conflict Resolution', *Journal of Peace Research* 2(3): 197-215.
- Pruitt, Dean, G., 1972. 'Methods for Resolving Differences of Interest: A Theoretical Analysis', *Journal of Social Issues* 28(1): 133-154.
- Pruitt, Dean, G., 1987. 'Creative Approaches to Negotiation', in Dennis J. D. Sandole & Ingrid Sandole-Staroste, eds, *Conflict Management and Problem Solving: Interpersonal to International Applications*. New York: New York University Press (62-76).
- Rapoport, Anatol, 1960. *Fights. Games and Debates*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Rath, Biraja Shankar, 1986. 'Gandhi and Conflict Resolution', *Gandhi Marg* 7(12): 850-857.
- Reychler, Luc, 1979. 'The Effectiveness of a Pacifist Strategy in Conflict Resolution: An Experimental Study', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 23(2): 228-260.
- Rinde, Erik & Stein Rokkan, 1959. 'Towards an International Program of Research on the Handling of Conflicts: Introduction', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 3(1): 1-5.
- Rogers, Carl, 1961. *On Becoming a Person: A Therapist's View of Psychotherapy*. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
- Rubin, Jeffrey Z. & Bert R. Brown, 1975. *The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiation*. New York: Academic Press.
- Schelling, Thomas C., 1960. *The Strategy of Conflict*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Scimecca, Joseph A., 1989. 'What is Conflict Resolution?', in Harold E. Pepinsky & Richard Quinney, eds, *Criminology as Peacemaking*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press (263-279).
- Sharp, Gene, 1959. 'A Review of Joan V. Bondurant, *Conquest of Violence: The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict*', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 3(4): 401-410.
- Sharp, Gene, 1973. *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*. Boston, MA: Porter Sargent.
- Shure, Gerald H.; Robert J. Meeker & Earle A. Hansford, 1965. 'The Effectiveness of Pacifist Strategies in Bargaining Games', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 9(1): 106-117.
- Siegel, Sidney & Lawrence E. Fouraker, 1960. *Bargaining and Group Decision Making*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Sørensen, Georg, 1992. 'Utopianism in Peace Research: The Gandhian Heritage', *Journal of Peace Research* 29(2): 135-144.
- Swingle, Paul G., 1970. 'Dangerous Games', in Paul Swingle, ed., *The Structure of Conflict*. New York: Academic Press (235-276).
- Tedeschi, James T. & Paul Rosenfeld, 1980. 'Communication in Negotiation and Bargaining', in Michael E. Roloff & Gerald R. Miller, eds, *Persuasion: New Directions in Theory and Research*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage (225-248).
- Tidwell, Alan, C., 1998. *Conflict Resolved? A Critical Assessment of Conflict Resolution*. London: Pinter.
- Ury, William, 1991. *Getting Past No: Negotiating with Difficult People*. New York: Bantam Books.
- Weber, Thomas, 1986. 'Legal Ethics/Gandhian Ethics', *Gandhi Marg* 7(10): 692-706.
- Weber, Thomas, 1991. *Conflict Resolution and Gandhian Ethics*. New Delhi: Gandhi Peace Foundation.
- Weber, Thomas, 1993. '“The Marchers Simply Walked Forward Until Struck Down”:

- Non-violent Suffering and Conversion', *Peace and Change* 18(3): 267–289.
- Weber, Thomas, 1999. 'Gandhi, Deep Ecology, Peace Research and Buddhist Economics', *Journal of Peace Research* 36(3): 349–361.
- Weiss-Wik, Stephen, 1983. 'Enhancing Negotiators' Successfulness: Self-Help Books and Related Empirical Research', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 24(4): 706–739.
- Wertheim, Eleanor; Anthony Love, Lyn Littlefield & Connie Peck, 1992. *I Win You Win: How to Have Fewer Conflicts, Better Solutions and More Satisfying Relationships*. Melbourne: Penguin.
- Wilson, Kellog V. & V. Edwin Bixenstine, 1964. 'Forms of Social Control in Two-Person Two-Choice Games', in Martin Shubik, ed., *Games Theory and Related Approaches to Social Behavior*. New York: Wiley (338–358).
- THOMAS WEBER, b. 1950, PhD in Social Sciences (La Trobe University, 1991), Senior Lecturer in Politics and Head of Peace Studies, La Trobe University (1991–). Most recent books: *Gandhi's Peace Army: The Shanti Sena and Unarmed Peacekeeping* (Syracuse University Press, 1996), *On the Salt March: The Historiography of Gandhi's March to Dandi* (HarperCollins, 1997) and (ed., with Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan) *Nonviolent Intervention Across Borders: A Recurrent Vision* (Spark M. Matsunaga Institute for Peace, 2000).