IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY

PARAMOUNT COMMUNICATIONS )
INC. and KDS ACQUISITION )
INC. )
Plaintiffs, )

V. C.A. No. 10866

TIME INCORPORATED, et al., )
Defendants. )

Chancery Court Chambers Public Building Wilmington, Delaware Monday, June 19, 1989 11:20 a.m.

BEFORE:

HON. WILLIAM T. ALLEN, Chancellor.

COURT'S RULING ON DISCOVERY PROBLEMS
PRESENTED IN TELEPHONE CONFERENCE

CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS
135 Public Building
Wilmington, Delaware 19801
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## APPEARANCES (telephonically):

DAVID C. McBRIDE, ESQ.

JOSY W. INGERSOLL, ESQ.

Young, Conaway, Stargatt & Taylor

-and-

MELVYN L. CANTOR, ESQ.

DAVID E. MASSENGILL, ESQ. (New York Bar)

Simpson Thacher & Bartlett

for Paramount Plaintiffs.

SHERRI R. SAVETT, ESQ. (Pennsylvania Bar)
Berger & Montague
for Shareholder Plaintiffs.

CHARLES F. RICHARDS, JR., ESQ. Richards, Layton & Finger -and-

HERBERT M. WACHTELL, ESQ. (New York Bar)
Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz
for Defendant Warner.

ROBERT D. JOFFE, ESQ. (New York Bar)
Cravath, Swaine & Moore
for Defendant Time.

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## RULING OF THE COURT

THE COURT: Counsel, I will try and make a ruling here in the spirit of moving these things ahead, disclaiming the capacity to gather all of this together in my mind and make as fine distinctions as time would permit.

Basically we are cast again into the realm governed by Rule 26(c) that directs the Court in the management of litigation to balance the legitimate needs and interests of litigants with respect to confidential and valuable information, while attempting to make available to adversaries that information that is necessary or appropriate under the language of Rule 26(a) to pursue the litigated claims.

This Court has had to grapple with this problem before and has yet to formulate a test that guides discretion in any perfectly predictable fashion. It is true, as counsel for Warner mentioned, that we attempt to have a realistic assessment of the kind that Paramount's counsel referred to at the close as to what such agreements should reasonably be expected to mean, or at least what others can reasonably worry about as to what they mean.

Three issues seem to me to be presented

here. In no particular order, they involve whether or not restricted documents as defined by the parties should be available to an investment banker and, if so, what investment banker. The sub issue is: Is a Chinese Wall sufficient protection?

The second issue is whether inside counsel for the party, Paramount, should also have access to restricted documents.

The third issue is what documents fall under this restricted document rubric.

The first issue, to my mind, is relatively easy. While I respect Paramount's wish to be advised by Morgan Stanley in the litigation, as it is advised by Morgan Stanley with respect to the underlying transaction, I recognize a risk to the defendants in having access to information that would otherwise not be available to any Morgan Stanley person, available to some Morgan Stanley personnel who were advising with respect to the litigation. I don't see an offsetting need to Paramount that justifies this additional risk to the defendants.

while it may be that most of the major investment banking firms have already chosen up sides in this transaction -- I don't know that -- there are no doubt people with expertise out there who can advise the

litigation lawyers with respect to the meaning of any restricted documents that come to the litigation lawyers' attention.

I don't know as an empirical matter whether Chinese Walls are effective most of the time, some of the time or only infrequently effective. I know that they require people to place trust in individuals that they don't know, and for that reason when large interests are involved, individuals have a right to distrust them.

I see no reason why in this instance that risk should be run when there seems to me to be an alternative.

Therefore, I will not require that a confidentiality order permit restricted documents to be disclosed to investment bankers employed by the Morgan Stanley firm, but I would require that some investment banker who enters into an undertaking to maintain confidence should be available to the ligation lawyers to assist them with respect to these documents.

The second issue to me is a very, very difficult issue. It is the case that in some of these litigations orders have been entered that restrict disclosure of documents to what we have called or has been called "lawyers' eyes only," meaning litigation lawyers' eyes. That is rather an anomalous resolution, it seems to

me. Mr. Joffe refers to the trade secret area. I'm not an expert in the area. I think there are a few cases where this very problem has been written on. I think the cases may point in different directions. There is not a lot of law out there in the trade secret area in this area, I don't think. There is none, aside from some oral rulings of this type, perhaps in this Court in this area.

I say it is anomalous because it is the party whose rights are being litigated. It is the party who has the right to make litigation decisions to have material, discoverable matters available to the litigation lawyer but not available to the party, that in a sense puts the litigation in a completely untenable position. He has to make substantive decisions affecting his client's rights without his client knowing it, or he has to advise his client to do one thing or another without informing him as to why he advises that. It is a very awkward and highly problematic situation. It has in some instances been done. But when it's been done, it seems to me, it is rather an ad hoc, practical working out of a specific problem in order to let the litigation move forward, and it has difficulties from a rationalizing or a principle point of view so far as I can see.

When the information is highly specific and

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limited, a court, recognizing the imperfections in the whole system, may be willing to impose it. But where we are not talking about particular documents but are talking about classes of documents that may be broad, that one of the parties' claims is broad and encompasses much, it is to my mind not appropriate to essentially cut off the party from the information. One could only do it on the basis that there would be no basis in law to provide any disclosure or discovery whatever.

I've got a natural suspicion that arises between adversaries at times like this and that that suspicion reasonably can be deeper with respect to in-house counsel than with respect to the outside firm advising the firm, I cannot at this time require Paramount to litigate the case without any Paramount personnel having access to restricted documents.

The third area involved the definition of "restricted documents." I don't have it clearly in mind, Frankly. But I do have some things to say that may be helpful to you. It does in a sense relate to the second point, because what it is that is restricted and available to only one or two members of Paramount is obviously related to whether or not some Paramount officer has

access to any of it.

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First, I conclude tentatively -- and reaching any kind of conclusions on a ruling of this kind is a little difficult, so I hesitate to use the word -but it is my present view that documents that are useful for the formulation of a step in this ongoing contest are legitimately highly confidential, whether you call them restricted documents or whatever. That is, it seems to me that this highly confidential and restricted category of documents is not or ought not be restricted simply to documents that have a competitive impact in the day-to-day businesses of these companies, but should extend as well to documents that would be useful to Paramount with respect to formulating another business step.

I said that this third category related to the second, and by that I meant there may be documents that are critically important to defendants and that they feel a compelling need to seek protection from discovery. The documents that were mentioned, I think it was by Mr. Joffe, showed the break-up value of Time or somebody's impression of the break-up value of Time and projections of future earnings.

I have, in ruling on matters of this kind in the past, attempted to leave room for a specific and

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I expressly do so today. If the defendants seek such a ruling with respect to these documents on break-up value and projections, I have to see the documents and I have to hear from them. Those documents for that purpose could be disclosed only to litigation counsel. I don't want to assume what's the effective way to litigate that question, if it is going to be raised, about specific documents. I leave it for another day. It should be brought on just as quickly as possible because it will interfere with the deposition schedule, because no doubt those will be centrally important.

I recognize that this kind of ruling is unsatisfactory in some ways. But let me reiterate what I have said.

Paramount can show the documents to an outside investment banker but not to Morgan Stanley, if the outside investment banker subjects himself to a confidentiality order. With respect to the inside lawyers, assuming they also are willing to enter into such an agreement, I think that they should be shown restricted documents, but I leave open the possibility that a small number of critical documents — thereby introducing a third level of confidentiality into this process — might

be litigated separately. But if it is to be done, it must 1 be done very, very promptly. 2 Is there anything that I have obviously left 3 on the table that needs to be decided? 4 5 MR. CANTOR: I just have one question by way of clarification. In your third category we would also 6 7 have to litigate the question of the outside expert seeing it or simply of Paramount's in-house counsel seeing it. 8 MR. JOFFE: We have no objection to your 9 10 outside experts seeing any document we produce. 11 MR. CANTOR: Okay. 12 THE COURT: That takes care of that. MR. JOFFE: I take it, Mel, you'll hold on 13 to the documents you presently have so we can review them 14 and decide whether or not we wish to put any of those into 15 a third category. 16 17 MR. CANTOR: Yes, but I would ask that it be done very promptly in accordance with the Chancellor's 18 observation, because depositions are starting on 19 20 Wednesday. MR. JOFFE: We will do it within 24 hours. 21 22 THE COURT: Mr. Joffe, I do encourage you to exercise restraint and judgment. I don't want to get a 23 whole pile of documents to go through. The whole point, 24

1	aside from the basically conservative nature of
2	introducing this notion, is that there may be a few
3	documents that are clearly very, very, very special.
4	MR. CANTOR: I understand, your Honor.
5	THE COURT: Thank you, counsel.
6	MR. CANTOR: Thank you very much.
7	THE COURT: Goodbye.
8	(Telephone conference concluded at
9	12:02 p.m.)
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## CERTIFICATE

I, JACK P. WHITE, Official Reporter for the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware, do hereby certify that the foregoing pages numbered 3 through 11 contain a true and correct transcription of the ruling of the Court in the proceedings as stenographically reported by me at the hearing in the above stated cause, before the Chancellor of the State of Delaware, on the date therein indicated.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand at Wilmington this 19th day of June 1989.

Official Reporter for the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware

Transcribed by: Ann B. Nolan